Abstract. We propose several new equilibrium models for auction based markets and show that they admit equivalent variational inequality formulations. This approach simplifies essentially both the derivation of existence and uniqueness results and construction of efficient solution methods. The new models may be considered as alternative to the known perfectly and imperfectly competitive economic equilibrium models.
Introduction
In comparison with the classical perfectly (Walrasian) and imperfectly (Cournot -Bertrand) competitive models, auction market models are paid considerably less attention and usually restricted with several game-theoretic problems which evaluate strategies of players for capturing the desired lot for different kinds of auction; see e.g. Moulin (1981) , Weber (1985) and references therein. This situation is due to the very popular opinion that just the above classical models give the most adequate description of behavior of the existing economic systems and that the decisions relying upon the classical principles provide both the stability and efficiency of an economy. However, the recent history of economic development shows clearly the necessity of certain control of economic processes. For instance, together with the privatization of great parts of the state property, say, in energy sector, the state usually keeps real tools for influence on these parts. Of course, these control mechanisms should be rather subtle and transparent, but they are behind the classical Walrasian or Bertrand-Cournot type models. The auction market principles may represent one of the possible ways in resolving this problem.
In this paper, following the approach from Konnov (2006b Konnov ( , 2007b Konnov ( , 2007c ), we describe several auction based equilibrium models which admit equivalent variational inequality formulations. This property enables us to obtain rather easily existence and uniqueness properties and computational methods by utilizing directly the results from the theory of variational inequalities, which is now developed rather well. Therefore, the models can be applied for investigation and solution of problems in real economic systems.
Single auctions of a homogeneous commodity with fixed prices
We start our considerations from the simplest auction market models where sellers and bidders announce their fixed prices and maximal offer/bid volumes.
A: Auction of sellers
Consider first the auction market where m sellers announce their fixed prices g i and maximal offer volumes a i for covering the prescribed bid volume b of a homogeneous commodity. Since the prices are fixed, the problem can It follows that the optimal offers are the following: x i = a i if i < k and x k = min{a k , b − i<k a i } and that the auction price is defined by p * = g k ; see Figure 1 .
B: Auction of buyers
Similarly, we can consider the auction market where l buyers announce their fixed prices h j and maximal bid volumes b j for covering the prescribed offer volume a of a homogeneous commodity. Then, without loss of generality, we suppose that i < j implies h i ≥ h j and find the index k such that 
C: Auction of sellers and buyers
Moreover, we can consider the general auction market problem where m sellers announce their fixed prices g i and maximal offer volumes a i and l buyers announce their fixed prices h j and maximal bid volumes b j .
In order to find a solution, we should rearrange the sellers indices such that i < j implies g i ≤ g j and rearrange the buyers indices such that i < j implies h i ≥ h j . Then we find any intersection point for S(p) and D(p), which gives the desired auction price; see Figure 3 , where p * ∈ [g 3 , h 3 ]. 
3 Single auctions of a homogeneous commodity with price functions
We are interested in investigation of more complicated behavior of participants, when the announced prices depend on offer/bid values. Let us now consider the auction market which involves m sellers and l buyers of a homogeneous commodity, the i-th seller announcing his minimal α i and maximal β i offer values and his price (inverse supply) function g i : R m+l → R, the j-th buyer announcing his minimal α j and maximal β j bid values and his price (inverse demand) function h j : R m+l → R, i.e. their prices depend on offer/bid values (x, y) where x = (x 1 , . . . , x m ) and y = (y 1 , . . . , y l ). The standard situation corresponds to the case when α i = 0 and α j = 0 for all i and j. Additionally, we can take into account the "passive" economic agents who do not participate explicitly in the auction process but agree beforehand with its price. We suppose that their total excess demand is fixed and equal to b, i.e. in case b = 0 we have the usual auction market. The value of b may be positive or negative and may in principle determine the prescribed dis-balance value. The usual choice b = 0 leads to the precise balance and forces the auction market to be a closed system. However, if b is an arbitrary parameter, we can place the model in more general settings and take into account the reaction of some other economic agents. The solution of the problem is constituted by a volumes vector (x * , y * ) and a price p * such that
and
and also
where
Thus, the choice of bid/offer volumes must be feasible in the sense of restrictions for volumes of economic agents and equilibrate the supply and demand, furthermore, each trader sells the minimal (respectively, maximal) value if its price is greater (less) than the (unknown) auction price p * , and each buyer purchases the maximal (respectively, minimal) value if its price is greater (less) than the (unknown) auction price p * , which conforms to the auction principle.
The main difficulty of the formulation (1)- (3) is in the fact that it involves the superfluous unknown auction price. We propose an equivalent variational inequality (VI) formulation of the problem for excluding the unknown price p * .
and rewrite conditions (1)- (2) as follows: (7). By using the other part of the same Karush-Kuhn-Tucker theorem, we obtain that there exists p * such that (6) holds, i.e. the Lagrangian defined in (5) has the saddle point. But (6) implies (1)- (2) and the result follows.
2
From the proof it follows that the auction price p * coincides with the Lagrange multiplier for the balance constraint
solving VI (4) we can find the auction price easily from (1)- (2) . Observe that each participant, unlike the perfect competition conditions, may utilize additional information about the other agents, however, the auctioneer rule equilibrating consumers and producers differs from those in imperfect competition models; see e.g. Arrow and Hahn (1971) , Okuguchi and Szidarovszky (1990) . However, we have the clear principle for setting the price. Next, we can utilize the well-developed techniques from the theory and solution methods of VIs for investigation and solution of the initial problem. For instance, we apply the known result that any VI with continuous mapping and convex and compact feasible set is solvable; see e.g. Facchinei and Pang (2003), Corollary 2.2.5.
Corollary 3.1 If the set Z is nonempty and bounded, and the functions
Obviously, solvability of VI (4) implies the solvability of the auction equilibrium problem (1)-(3) with the corresponding feasible set. The uniqueness may be derived under the strict monotonicity of the mapping (x, y) → (g, −h). There are many other existence and uniqueness theorems for VIs, including the unbounded case (see e.g. Facchinei and Pang (2003) and references therein), which can be also applied to the above problems.
Iterative solution methods for single auction market problems
The results of the previous section also enable us to find a solution of auction market problems. In particular, using numerous iterative algorithms for VIs (see Patriksson (1999) , Konnov (2001a Konnov ( , 2007b ), Facchinei and Pang (2003)) we can model various dynamic auction market processes and investigate their stability (convergence). Of course, these algorithms can be used for computation of a solution of auction market problems.
The simplest of such methods is the well-known projection method, which consists in generating the iteration sequence {(x k , y k )} in conformity with the formula:
where θ k > 0 is the stepsize parameter. The preference of this method is that it always gives a convex quadratic programming subproblem, which has a unique solution if the set Z is nonempty, i.e. under very mild assumptions. The convergence of the projection algorithm may require certain additional strengthened monotonicity or integrability assumptions; see e.g. Patriksson (1999) , Konnov (2007b) , Facchinei and Pang (2003) .
Another basic procedure is the Frank-Wolfe or conditional gradient method, which represents the sequential solution of auction problems for each commodity with the corresponding sequence of fixed prices for arbitrary volumes. More precisely, we can find components of the next iterate (x k+1 , y k+1 ) as solutions of series of linear programming problems
The implementation of this procedure is also very simple, but it requires additionally the boundedness of the set Z. Moreover, the convergence of the "pure" Frank-Wolfe algorithm require certainly integrability assumptions; see e.g. Dem'yanov and Rubinov (1968) and Patriksson (1999) .
If we are interested in creation of iterative methods which do not require a priori information about the problem and ensure stability (convergence) under rather mild conditions, we can incorporate the above iterations within the combined relaxation process; see Konnov (2001a) .
For the sake of convenience, we set
8 then we can rewrite problem (4) in the general VI format:
We denote by Z * its solution set and introduce the following basic assumptions:
is a continuous monotone mapping. The above assumptions seem rather natural. Following Konnov (1993 Konnov ( , 2001a , we apply the projection-based combined relaxation method, which is convergent under the above assumptions and describe the dynamic process where the participants utilize the extrapolated offer/bid values for their decisions.
Method (CRM). Choose a point z

0
∈ Z and numbers α ∈ (0, 1),
and set p
and k = k + 1. Here π Z [·] denotes the projection mapping onto Z. The k-th iteration is complete.
Since the termination of (CRM) yields a solution, we shall consider only the case when it generates an infinite iteration sequence. Note that
i.e., (11) represents the projection iteration and can be implemented with finite algorithms. Convergence of (CRM) with linesearch was investigated in Konnov (1993 Konnov ( , 2001a under the additional Lipschitz continuity assumption. Applying Theorem 1.3.1 from Konnov (2001a), we obtain the convergence property for the case of a fixed stepsize. 
Furthermore, we are able to ensure convergence under only continuity of G. Let us consider the following linesearch procedure.
(Rule L) Find s as the smallest non-negative integer such that
Convergence of the method with linesearch was established in Konnov (2007a). 
Proposition 2 Suppose that (A1) and (A2) are fulfilled. If a sequence {z
} is generated by Method (CRM) with Rule L, then (12) holds.
The similar combined relaxation method with the Frank-Wolfe iteration was substantiated in Konnov (2007c) .
If we are interested in simultaneous finding offer/bid values and auction market prices, we can apply one of the multiplier methods, which also require only monotonicity of the mapping (g, −h); see Konnov (2001b Konnov ( , 2002b . We describe such a method for problem (1)-(3). For brevity, set
Method (ML). Choose a point p 0 ∈ R and a number η > 0. At the k-th iteration, k = 0, 1, . . ., we have a point p k and find the next point in conformity with the rule:
In this process, the participants also take into account extrapolated values of the auction price, but it is sufficient for convergence under the above assumptions. 
, constitutes a solution of problem (1)-(3).
The proof can be obtained by the modification of the corresponding proofs from Konnov (2001b Konnov ( , 2002b and is omitted. Observe that the method with approximate solutions of subproblems possesses similar convergence properties.
A mixed multi-commodity equilibrium model
The auction market models described in the previous sections admit various modifications and extensions. We now present two extensions which reflect different roles of auction markets in economic systems. In this section, we describe a mixed type equilibrium model where auction markets subordinate other subsystems in the sense that the agents of these subsystems accept the price decisions of auction markets.
The model consists of n auction markets for n different commodities and of some other economic agents (consumers and producers) whose joint behavior is described by the excess demand mapping p → E(p), where p = (p 1 , . . . , p n ) is a given price vector. We denote by I k and J k , respectively, the index sets of sellers and buyers of the k-th local market associated to the k-th commodity. It is supposed that the i-th
We define the sets of offer/bid bounds for the k-th auction
We say that vectors (x *
. . , n and p * ∈ P constitute the equilibrium if
k = 1, . . . , n; and n k=1 i∈I k
where P denotes the set of feasible prices, which is supposed to be a nonempty and convex subset in R n . Obviously, (13) and (14) represent the auction price decisions whereas (15) is the usual market price equilibrium condition. In fact, if P is the non-negative orthant
it yields the complementarity conditions
for k = 1, . . . , n, whereas P = R n gives the balance condition (cf. (3)):
However, conditions (13) and (14) are equivalent to the system of variational inequalities
for k = 1, . . . , n. Thus, the equilibrium problem is formulated as a primaldual system of variational inequalities; see e.g. Konnov (2002a) , (2003)-(2006a) and references therein. Observe that we can utilize the well-known approaches to model behavior of consumers and producers out of auction markets, which are accepted in the Walrasian equilibrium models; see Nikaido (1968), Arrow and Hahn (1971), Scarf and Hansen (1973) . Therefore, in such a way we can obtain a mixed type economic system subordinated to auction markets. Again, we can deduce the existence and uniqueness results for this model by using the theory of variational inequalities; see Konnov (2001a) , Facchinei and Pang (2003) . For instance, we give the existence results for compact feasible sets.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the sets X (k) and Y (k)
, k = 1, . . . , n are nonempty and bounded, the set P is nonempty, convex and compact, the func-
j, k, and the mapping E is continuous on P . Then problem (15)-(16) has a solution.
In the unbounded case, similar results are usually based upon a suitable coercivity condition.
Various algorithms for the primal-dual systems of variational inequalities from Konnov (2002a) , (2003)-(2006a) can be adjusted both for computation of equilibrium points and for modelling the dynamic processes in this system. We now give an illustration of one of dual Uzawa type methods (see Konnov (2002a) ) applied to system (15) 
Note that problem (16) reflects the decisions of sellers and buyers within the k-th auction market and can be solved easily by using the equivalent formulations (13) and (14), whereas (17) may be treated as a "tâtonnement" process governed by auctioneers with taking into account the total excess demand other economic agents. Convergence of this process requires strengthened monotonicity properties of the mappings g, −h, and −E. At the same time, there exist many other algorithms converging to a solution under rather general conditions.
Constrained spatial auction models
There are many kinds of spatial economic equilibrium models which take into account locations of economic agents involved in the system; see e.g. Nagurney (1999). These models are very popular in investigation both perfectly and imperfectly competitive distributed economic systems; various examples of applications are described e.g. in Facchinei and Pang (2003) , Konnov (2007b) . We now describe a spatial equilibrium model of distributed auction markets of a homogeneous commodity, which is based on the model presented in Section 3. In this model, unlike the previous section, the auction markets do not manage the whole system and their reactions are used for obtaining the general equilibrium.
The model involves n markets of a homogeneous commodity, which are joined by links (roads) in a network. We denote by I k and J k , respectively, the index sets of sellers and buyers of the k-th local market associated with the k-th node. It is supposed that the i-th seller chooses his offer value x i within the segment [α i , β i ] with α i ≥ 0 for i ∈ I k and the j-th buyer chooses his bid value y j within the segment [α j , β j ] with α j ≥ 0 for j ∈ J k , moreover, their prices can depend on the offer/bid volumes at this auction, i.e. given the volume vectors x (k) = (x i ) i∈I k and y (k) = (y j ) j∈J k , the i-th seller (j-th buyer) determines his price
Due to the auction principle, the solutions (x *
must satisfy the auction market conditions:
where p * k is the (unknown) auction clearing price of the k-th market; i.e they coincide with (13) and (14) . Next, the solutions must satisfy the market balance equation:
where u * k is the (unknown) value of external demand and these values give the total balance equation for the system:
However, we have also to take into account the conditions on the graph associated with the system of distributed markets. We denote by A the set of all the arcs joining the nodes attributed to markets. Let f a denote the commodity flow for arc a = (k, l) and let [b a , b a ] be the segment of feasible upper capacity bounds for this arc. The formulation admits negative values both for the flow and for some bounds, which correspond to the reverse direction of the flow. Observe that bounds can be non-symmetric, i.e. b a = −b a in general. Given the flow vector f = (f a ) a∈A we can define the cost c a = c a (f ) of shipment of one unit of the commodity along arc a ∈ A. Next, for a given node k, we denote by A + k and A − k the sets of incoming and outgoing arcs at k. Note that I k and J k can be empty for some k and this case corresponds to an intermediate node.
If f * is the optimal flow distribution corresponding to x * (21), then we have the node balance equation
and the flow capacity constraints
Thus, the constrained spatial market equilibrium problem consists in finding (18)- (20) for k = 1, . . . , n and (21)- (23), where
We now present a variational inequality problem, whose solutions satisfy the above conditions. Set
and define the set
The problem is to find ( , k = 1, . . . , n such that (18)-(20) for k = 1, . . . , n and (21)- (23) 
i.e., p * = (p * 1 , . . . , p * n ) is the vector of Lagrange multipliers for the node balance equation (27). If we determine the numbers u * k , k = 1, . . . , n from (22), then (27) gives (20) . Moreover, summing (22) 
since the right-hand side expression involves twice the flow value for each arc a with opposite signs. Hence, (21) also holds. Next, we see that (26) is equivalent to the following set of partial variational inequalities:
(28)
The first two series of inequalities in (28) are equivalent to (18) and (19), respectively. The proof is complete.
Observe that for any solution of problem (18)- (23) obtained from VI (24)-(25) the auction clearing prices p * k , k = 1, . . . , n are Lagrange multipliers for the node balance constraints. At the same time, the reverse assertion is not true in general, i.e. for any solution (18)- (23) the auction clearing prices p * k need not be the Lagrange multipliers.
Example 6.1 Consider the simplest model of two auction markets joined by one costless two-directional link, i.e. c 12 = 0. Each market involves one seller and one buyer whose prices are fixed, i.e.
Then problem (11) 
In fact, (24)-(25) is a VI with continuous cost mapping and nonempty, convex, and compact feasible set. Hence, the result then follows e.g. from Theorem 11.3 in Konnov (2007b) .
Recall that a mapping T is said to be (i) monotone if for each u , u it holds that
(ii) strictly monotone if for each u , u , u = u , it holds that
Combining Proposition 5 with Proposition 1.14 in Konnov (2007b) , we obtain also the uniqueness result. 
(cf. (9)). The implementation of this procedure is very simple, but it again requires additionally the boundedness of the set W . Moreover, the convergence of the "pure" Frank-Wolfe algorithm requires certainly integrability assumptions.
Next, the well-known projection method now consists in generating the iteration sequence {(x s , y s , f s )} in conformity with the formula: 
where θ s > 0 is the stepsize parameter (cf. (8)). Again we see that (29) is a convex quadratic programming subproblem, which has a unique solution if the set W is nonempty, i.e. under very mild assumptions. The convergence of the projection algorithm may also require strengthened monotonicity or integrability assumptions. In order to obtain a convergent process under more general assumptions, we can construct combined relaxation methods including iterations of the above methods as in Section 4.
Note that one can find a solution to (29) by finite algorithms. At the same time, the dual Uzawa type methods seem also very attractive for solving this problem. In fact, we can solve (29) via solving the dual problem
where ϕ s (p) = min Clearly, the computation of the values of ϕ s and its gradient can be made componentwise, i.e. (31) is decomposed into a set of separable one-dimensional problems each of them has the explicit solution formula. In order to solve (30) we can apply a suitable conjugate gradient method. The projection method (29) becomes very efficient if all the prices g i and h j are fixed and c a ≡ 0, since it then coincides with the proximal point method and possesses the finite termination property; see e.g. Rockafellar (1976) .
This combined proximal point and dual conjugate gradient method for subproblems was implemented for solving several spatial auction problems arising in electricity market systems and showed rather fast convergence to a solution. The norm of violations of conditions (26), (27) was taken as error evaluation and its accuracy 0.1 appeared sufficient for computation.
Example 7.1 Consider the model of five auction markets with fixed prices joined by two-directional links in a tree. Each market involves one buyer. The numbers of sellers are the following: market 1 -108, market 2 -63, market 3 -48, market 4 -22, market 5 -44; see Figure 5 . The problem was solved via the combined projection and dual conjugate gradient method in 72 iterations. In the picture, ∆ denotes the excess supply at the market, p denotes the auction price at the market. Example 7.2 Consider the model of nineteen auction markets with fixed prices joined by two-directional links in a tree. These markets involve 7 buyers and 106 sellers. The problem is depicted at Figure 6 . It was solved via the combined projection and dual conjugate gradient method in 280 iterations. The solution is presented at Figure 7 .
